by Chiara Loda, Marie Curie Fellow at the Institute for International Conflict Resolution And Reconstruction, Dublin City University
EEAS officials agree in saying that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries should be dealt with on the basis of a tailor-made approach. To this end, in addition to looking at the peculiarities of these countries, attention should be paid to the way they project themselves vis-a-vis an external audience. Providing some conceptual framework to that, this paper argues that the conscious attempt to seducing an external public should be considered a form of public diplomacy, possible also for those states which cannot afford the hosting of grand events. The case of Armenia offers a remarkable example of that. The country, in spite of its partnership with Russia and the precarious security situation, has consistently displayed its interest in being a “good citizen of the international community”. Examples of that are the invitation of international observers, in occasion of the the parliamentary elections, and the request of Venice commission’s advice on the constitutional reform. Without postulating direct causality, yet this policy paper argues that the Armenian consistent self-projection as a “willing child” has brought some results in term of engagement with the EU. Beyond the case studies, it seems emerging the need for a broader definition of public diplomacy, including acts of self-promotion such as public declarations and a conciliatory attitude. In terms of policy recommendation, policy-makers are suggested to treat this kind of initiatives as a proxy for the different level of understanding that these countries have of the EU.
Introduction
The European Union External Action (EEAS) officials, evaluating the track record of the Eastern Partnership (EaP)[1], seem to agree on the limits of a one-size-fits-all outlook and, pertinently, to support the establishment of a more differentiated approach. That emerges from official documents and declarations, as the following example illustrate. “[The Eastern Partnership] Summit participants reaffirm the Eastern Partnership objective to develop strengthened, differentiated relations between the EU and its six sovereign, independent partners”. This point, which was included into the “Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit” (Riga, 21-22 May 2015)[2], was successfully reaffirmed by Johannes Hahn, the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations, who spoke in favour of a: “Differentiated approach and even more tailor-made strategies on the side of the EU, which is already one of the cornerstones of the ongoing ENP review[3]”. In the common acceptation, a “differentiated approach” seems related to the understanding of local context and actors. Additionally, according to this policy paper, the observation of the various EaP countries should also include their self-promotion effort vis-à-vis a Western audience.
Currently, most studies about seducing a foreign public are conducted within a framework of public diplomacy, which is usually defined as the: “Instrument that governments use (…) to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries[4]”. In this regard, the bulk of the analyses of extra-European cases focuses on the attempt of winning over a foreign public by means of grand events, such as sporting conventions[5]. Examples of that are studies on Russia[6], China[7], Qatar[8] and Azerbaijan[9]. However, this predominant attention on lavishing events limits the possible case study population to those countries that can afford it. Conversely, alternative forms of self-promotion are overlooked. This paper considers that, in order to gain a wider understanding of international dynamics and partners, a broader acceptation of public diplomacy is needed. In this regard, it is here proposed that the purposive showing of “international goodwill” should be treated and analysed as an attempt to seducing an external public.
In the next paragraphs, it is outlined the case of Armenia which, in spite of its economic constraints and some geopolitical challenges, strives to show its commitment to being a reliable and reasonable international partner. After proposing an attentive reconstruction of the context, mostly conducted through the assessment of primary and secondary sources, this paper brings forward some recommendations for EU policy makers.
Armenia: are strategic narratives a form of soft power?
In September 2016, referring to the parliamentary elections due to be held in the spring of 2017, the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan declared that: “I am sure that all these measures will contribute to raising public confidence in electoral process and ensure that we meet international standards for free and fair elections. Parliamentary elections will be held in our country in several months. The Republic of Armenia will send invitations to all partners for their participation in international monitoring missions[10]”. Even though there is no perfect match between words and facts, yet the very act of voicing such commitment is noteworthy.
Armenia is not a consolidated democracy, as clearly stated by “Freedom House-Nations in Transit” report[11]. In 2016 (like in the previous years) Armenia has been classed as a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. In particular, with reference to electoral processes, it is considered that the level of local self-governance remains insufficient. Looking at recent events, in the aftermath of the parliamentary election in 2017, both the political oppositions and civic movements reported widespread frauds in the conduct of the electoral campaign and the pooling operations[12]. Additionally, corruption remains pervasive[13]. In spite of that, in recent times, Armenian elites have often voiced their search for international advice and approval before implementing major reforms. Relevant examples of that are the parliamentary elections of April 2017 and the recent constitutional reform (approved by referendum on December 2015).
Before the parliamentary election of April 2017, the following groups of international observers were formally invited: the Council of Europe, PACE, OSCE, and CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. Such a move was widely expected. Additionally, the Armenian government has been cooperating with international donors towards the enhancement of electoral capabilities and transparency. For example, after some talks, the Government and the EU delegation in Armenia agreed on the funding and purchasing of cameras to be placed in the polling stations[14]. This search for the cooperation and, more indirectly, the approval of the international community (especially EU and the US) is not new. In July 2015, before submitting the text of the new constitution to the voters, the Armenian authorities asked the Venice Commission (the advisory body of the Council of Europe specialised in constitutional law matters) for an advisory legal opinion. Following the opinion, the draft of the constitutional reform was amended accordingly. This cooperative attitude is diametrically opposed to the hyper-assertive behaviour of neighbouring (and arch-enemy) Azerbaijan. Notably, in November 2016, the Azerbaijani Constitution was modified by referendum[15]. On that occasion, the government in Baku, despite of severe criticism from the opposition, refrained from asking for any external advisory opinion on the draft. Notwithstanding the lack of a formal invitation, but in response to a request from several human rights defenders, the Venice Commission issued an urgent preliminary opinion on the draft (which was not formally discussed by the Azerbaijani authorities), highlighting concerns on matters like civil liberties and over-empowerment of the presidency[16].
Armenia’s attempt to self-portray as a “good international citizen” seems in line with the consolidated “complementarian” foreign policy approach[17], which means aiming the maximum interaction with the West within the leeway consented by Russia. Notably, in spite of its membership in the Russian-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO) and the Eurasian Union (EEU), Armenia seems to be on remarkably good terms with the EU. Notably, on February 26th the “Enhanced Partnership Agreements” were concluded, and will be followed by procedural steps and by the signature of the agreement[18].This is happening roughly three years after the “Armenian U-Turn”, which at the time seemed to sign the collapse of the cooperation between Yerevan and Brussels. More in details, in September 2013, after the sudden withdrawal of Yerevan from Association Agreement (AA) talks with the EU, Brussels made clear that Armenia was not eligible for any alternative form of association. This did not prevent Armenian officials, including the President, from making frequent comments about the desire for the resumption of the cooperation with the EU[19]. In sum, without postulating any direct causality, this consistent expression of interest seems to have helped the Armenian cause, as shown by the current ongoing negotiations.
Public diplomacy: an acceptation beyond the stadiums
In light of the main argument of this paper, which is the need for treating self-projection strategies as acts of public diplomacy, Armenia is making successful use of its soft power (i.e. persuading others to do something without resorting to coercion). Notably Yerevan, in spite of its binding ties with Russia, has convinced the EU of the importance of not abandoning its “willing child”. Even though it would be superficial and dismissive to ascribe this outcome solely to Armenia’s “good international attitude”, it is safe to say that it has played some role. In other words, Armenia, notwithstanding its binding ties with Russia, has been successful in portraying itself as an eager partner of the EU, as evincible from the consistent proactive search of external advice. This is in sharp contrast to the Azerbaijani strategy, which until recently was more focused on grand events rather than on initiatives and reforms[20]. Going beyond these specific cases, these observations may be relevant to the broader understanding of soft power and public diplomacy. While the limits of building stadiums seems have been realised now, more attention should be paid to “international goodwill”.
Other than making possible the analysis of a wide range of cases, this broad acceptation of public diplomacy concurs to the understanding of why mega-events, such as sporting competitions, have limited power in seducing an external (Western) audience. As Nye points out, “The best propaganda is not propaganda”. This refers to the mediocre outcomes of Russian and Chinese soft-power strategies, which project a government-crafted message that, ultimately, is not credible[21]. A similar point can be made about neighbouring Azerbaijan, which for years has implemented an (expensive) state-sponsored public diplomacy strategy, involving both grand events and a carefully planned official narrative. In spite of the effort, during the “European Games” of 2015 the international spotlight was on political prisoners rather than on the brand-new stadiums[22]. By contrast, as shown by the Armenian case, performing compliance to Western norms and principles seems way more effective, and henceforth addressing the actual preferences of the targeted audience, seem way more cost-effective.
Policy-making recommendations
In light of this analysis, the following recommendations can be made:
- Public diplomacy should not be narrowly conceived as the organisation of grand events. Instead, attention should be also paid to public declarations and international compliance. Other than being an intellectual exercise, this wider acceptation allows the assessment of the strategic skills of external partners.
- Armenia must be acknowledged as a skilful external partner, able to understand the EU’s preferences and incorporate them into its self-promotion strategy. Examples of that are the request of assistance in legislative reforms and electoral operations.
- Conversely, it must be admitted that not all the EaP countries have such a sound understanding of the EU as interlocutor. For instance, the event-based public diplomacy of Azerbaijan is hardly suitable to attract a Western public.
- In order to understand the differences among EaP countries, it must be looked, inter alia, to their self-promotion strategies. The incorporation of them into the analysis can concur to the formulation of a more accurate tailor-made approach.
This policy paper is based on the development of the blogpost: Loda, C. 2017. “Armenia – Shortcomings in the parliamentary elections and the long shadow of the future”, Presidential Power Blog, February 8, http://presidential-power.com/?p=6014 .
This research was supported by a FP7/Marie Curie ITN action. Grant agreement N°: 316825
[1] The EaP was launched in 2009 and includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
[2] EEAS. 2015. “Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, 21-22 May 2015)”, Document, 22 May, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/eastern/docs/riga-declaration-220515-final_en.pdf .
[3] Hahn, J. 2015. “Riga Summit: A strong but differentiated partnership”, European Commission, Blogpost, May 26, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/blog/riga-summit-strong-differentiated-partnership_en .
[4] Nye Jr, J.S., 2008. Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American academy of political and social science, 616(1), pp.94-109: p. 95.
[5] Grix, J. and Lee, D., 2013. Soft power, sports mega-events and emerging states: The lure of the politics of attraction. Global Society, 27(4), pp.521-536.
[6] Ostapenko, N., 2010. Nation branding of Russia through the Sochi Olympic Games of 2014. Journal of Management Policy and Practice, 11(4), pp.60-63; Alekseyeva, A., 2014. Sochi 2014 and the rhetoric of a new Russia: Image construction through mega-events. East European Politics, 30(2), pp.158-174.
[7] Hartig, F., 2012. Confucius Institutes and the rise of China. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 17(1), pp.53-76; Lee, A.L., 2010. Did the Olympics help the nation branding of China? Comparing public perception of China with the Olympics before and after the 2008 Beijing Olympics in Hong Kong. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6(3), pp.207-227.
[8] Brannagan, P.M. and Giulianotti, R., 2015. Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar, global sport and football’s 2022 World Cup finals. Leisure Studies, 34(6), pp.703-719.
[9] Loda, C., 2016. Azerbaijan, Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 27, pp.39-55.
[10] ARMINFO News Agency. 2016. “Armenia’s President: Armenia’s new government’s task is to give new impetus to development of economy”, September 17 (retrieved through LexisNexis).
[11] Freedom House. 2016. “Armenia”, Nations in Transit Report, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2016/armenia .
[12] Loda, C. 2017. “Armenia – Shortcomings in the parliamentary elections and the long shadow of the future”, Presidential Power Blog, April 12, http://presidential-power.com/?p=6280 .
[13] Freedom House. 2016. “Armenia”, Nations in Transit Report, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2016/armenia .
[14] Hambardzumian, Artak. 2017. “EU Envoy Upbeat On Armenian Vote Broadcasts”, Azatutyun RFE/RL, January 24, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/28255258.html.
[15] Loda, C. 2016. “Azerbaijan – A New Constitutional Reform: Towards a Monarchical Presidency?”, Presidential Power Blog, September 26, http://presidential-power.com/?p=5362 .
[16] Ibidem.
[17] Minasyan, S., 2012. Multi-vectorism in the foreign policy of post-Soviet Eurasian states. Demokratizatsiya, 20(3), p.268.
[18] EEAS. “EU-Armenia relations”, Headquarters, February 27, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4080/EU-Armenia%20relations.
[19] Loda, C., 2016, May. Perception of the EU in Armenia: A View from the Government and Society. In Caucasus, the EU and Russia-Triangular Cooperation? (pp. 131-152). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
[20] Also in the case of Azerbaijan, the targeted audience is the western one. For a more detailed analysis, see: Loda, Azerbaijan, Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy.
[21] Nye, J.S. 2013. “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power”, National Herald Tribune, May 2 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).
[22] Loda, C., 2016. Azerbaijan, Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 27, pp.39-55.